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Not Only in My Backyard but on My Front Stoop:  
The Forgotten Opinion of Urbanites About  
Concealed-Carry in Missouri 
Christopher T. Pierce* 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States is a nation divided along population lines. 
Every year, the interests and concerns of urban populations grow 
farther from those of their rural counterparts. This chasm is especially 
evident in recent election results.1 Politicians win or lose based on 
their ability to appeal to either rural or urban voters,2 as demonstrated 
by the last two presidential elections. During the 2000 and 2004 
elections, the Electoral College process balanced urban Democratic 
voters in New York and California against predominantly rural voters 
in Mississippi, Montana and West Virginia.3 Gun control was one 
 
 * J.D. (2006), Washington University School of Law; B.A. in English (2001), Carleton 
College.  The author would like to thank his family, especially his wife and mother.  Without 
their inspiration and support, nothing would have been, or would be, possible. 
 1. CNN exit polling after the 2004 presidential election showed that a large majority of 
rural voters voted for President George W. Bush, while most urban voters voted for Senator 
John Kerry. The suburban vote was closer, but also favored President Bush. See CNN.com, 
Election 2004, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/US/P/00/epolls.0. 
html (last visited May 16, 2006). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See Population of Mississippi, http://www.classbrain.com/artstate/publish/article_ 
1245.shtml (last visited May 16, 2006) (reporting that the 2000 census noted Mississippi’s 
population to be 1,388,560 urban and 1,456,098 rural); Population of West Virginia, 
http://www.classbrain.com/artstate/publish/article_1272.shtml (last visited May 16, 2006) 
(reporting that West Virginia’s 2000 population was 832,780 urban and 975,564 rural); 
Population of Montana, http://www.classbrain.com/artstate/publish/article_1247.shtml (last 
visited May 16, 2006) (reporting that Montana’s population in 2000 was 487,465 urban and 
414,730 rural). All of these states voted for George W. Bush in 2000. See Presidential Election 
2000, http://nationalatlas.gov/printable/images/pdf/elections/elect14.pdf (last visited May 16, 
2006). 
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key issue on which urban and rural voters sharply disagreed.4 
However, the political process is not the only thing affected by the 
ever-increasing rift in our society; the laws by which we live also 
reflect this split.5 While debate over other laws can be contentious, 
nowhere is the rift between urban and rural populations more heated 
than in debates over gun control legislation.6 
Missouri is a prime example of a state divided along population 
density lines regarding gun legislation.7 On September 11, 2003, 
 
 4. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural 
Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1293 (2003) (“[I]n the 2000 
election, their respective support for and opposition to gun control may well have cost 
Democrats the White House and Republicans control of the U.S. Senate.”); Jonathon Cowan & 
Jim Kessler, Changing the Gun Debate, BLUEPRINT MAG., July/Aug. 2001, at 30–33 (stating 
that “[i]n November 2000 voters from gun-owning households made up roughly half of the 
electorate and two-thirds of them voted for George W. Bush,” and that “[f]ive of seven NRA-
backed candidates for the Senate lost”). CNN exit polling after the 2004 election showed that a 
strong majority of gun owners once again favored President George W. Bush, see Election 
2004, supra note 1, despite John Kerry’s attempt to paint himself as a sportsman during a 
hunting trip to the swing state of Ohio. 
 5. Urban and rural populations have taken opposing sides on many debates in the United 
States. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 439–40 
(1999) (“All else equal, support for the death penalty is more prevalent among . . . country 
dwellers than city dwellers . . . .” (citing Dennis R. Longmire, Americans’ Attitudes About the 
Ultimate Weapon: Capital Punishment, in AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND JUSTICE: A 
NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 93, 99 (Timothy J. Flanagan & Dennis R. Longmire eds., 
1996))). The recent presidential election has made the differences between rural and urban 
populations even clearer. Many of the “moral laws” that commentators have cited as one of the 
keys to President Bush’s re-election, including anti-gay marriage and anti-gaming laws, are far 
more popular in rural areas than in urban areas. See Election 2004, supra note 1. 
 6. See, e.g., Kahan & Braman, supra note 4, at 1318–19. 
Control partisans ridicule their adversaries as “hicksville cowboys,” members of the 
“big belt buckle crowd” whose love of guns stems from their “macho, Freudian hang-
ups,” while NRA President Charlton Heston declares “cultural war” against “blue-
blooded elitists” who threaten an “America . . . where you [can] . . . be white without 
feeling guilty, [and] own a gun without shame.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 7. See A Vote for Sanity, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 7, 1999, at B10; E.J. Dionne, 
Faith in System Won, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 19, 1999, at D17; Missouri Backers of 
Concealed Weapons Ignore the Public, KAN. CITY STAR, Feb. 5, 2002, at B6. Missouri also acts 
as a good barometer for the rest of the nation concerning issues broader than gun legislation. 
R.W. Apple, Jr., With Bush Advancing, Missouri May Be a Battleground All but Conquered, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2004, at A21 (“Neither wholly Southern nor wholly Northern, fully 
Eastern nor fully Western, [Missouri] is America writ small. Most of its demographic 
characteristics—its residents’ age, marital status, income and educational levels—mirror the 
nation’s.”). 
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siding with rural interests, a super-majority of the Missouri General 
Assembly overrode a gubernatorial veto to become the forty-fifth 
state to adopt legislation permitting the carrying of concealed 
weapons.8 Six months later, in Brooks v. State,9 the Missouri 
Supreme Court ignored the outcry in Missouri’s two largest 
population centers, St. Louis and Kansas City,10 by holding the 
concealed-carry law constitutional.11  
This Note attempts to shed light on an area of the gun-control 
debate that is often ignored: the divergent interests of rural and urban 
populations regarding gun legislation.12 Part I focuses on the history 
of concealed-carry in Missouri. Part II identifies some of the differing 
interests of urban and rural populations concerning gun control in 
general, and concealed-carry laws in particular. Part III briefly 
explains possible reasons that Missouri abandoned its urban 
populations and the potential costs and benefits of doing so. Part IV 
explores solutions to the concealed-carry problem in urban centers. 
I. THE HISTORY OF CONCEALED-CARRY IN MISSOURI 
By September 11, 2003, most states had adopted some form of 
legislation allowing permit holders to carry concealed weapons.13 
Missouri was an exception.14 Prior to this date, it was a crime in 
 
 8. COMM. ON CRIME PREVENTION & PUB. SAFETY, SUMMARY OF THE COMMITTEE 
VERSION OF THE BILL, HB 349, 120, 136 & 328, 92d General Assembly, 2d Ex. Sess. (2003), 
available at http://www.house.state.mo.us/bills03/sumpdf/HB0349c.pdf. 
 9. 128 S.W.3d 844 (Mo. 2004). 
 10. Many editorials condemning the new concealed-carry law were written for the two 
largest newspapers in the state, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and the Kansas City Star. See supra 
note 7. 
 11. Brooks, 128 S.W.3d at 851. 
 12. The goal of this Note is quite similar to Kahan and Braman’s goal of influencing 
policy makers to fashion “policies expressively rich enough to enable all parties to find their 
cultural visions affirmed by the law.” Kahan & Braman, supra note 4, at 1322. The first step of 
such a project is “to clarify, to the greatest extent possible, the nature of the conflicting cultural 
views at stake in the gun control debate.” Id. at 1323. While it may seem overly simplistic to 
characterize cultures as either rural or urban, the dichotomy provides a useful starting point.  
 13. COMM. ON CRIME PREVENTION & PUB. SAFETY, supra note 8, at 4 (“Supporters say 
that Missouri is one of just six states that do not allow citizens to acquire a permit to carry a 
concealed firearm.”). 
 14. Id. 
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Missouri for an individual to carry a concealed weapon unless he or 
she was a police officer or fit into another limited exception.15  
In 1999, a majority of Missouri voters, led by a higher-than-
expected turn out in urban counties, rejected Proposition B—a 
referendum calling for a concealed-carry law similar to the one 
eventually adopted.16 While urban and suburban voters soundly 
defeated Proposition B, rural voters overwhelmingly approved it.17 
Although it appeared by this vote that a majority of Missouri citizens 
wanted the carrying of a concealed weapon to remain a crime for 
private citizens, the Missouri General Assembly thought otherwise. 
With rural voters in mind, a supermajority of the Missouri General 
Assembly overrode a veto by Governor Bob Holden and repealed the 
existing law banning concealed weapons on September 11, 2003.18 
The General Assembly replaced the old law with new provisions 
allowing the carrying of concealed weapons by those with a permit.19 
Missouri’s new concealed-carry permit policy is that the state shall 
 
 15. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 571.030.1–.2 (2000) (extending the exception to the prohibition 
against carrying concealed weapons not only to peace officers, but also to members of the 
armed forces and national guard while performing their official duties, federal probation 
officers, state probation or parole officers, wardens, etc.). 
 16. See A Vote for Sanity, supra note 7; Dionne, supra note 7. 
 17. See A Vote for Sanity, supra note 7 (“In rural areas, where the referendum was viewed 
as a basic test of gun rights, it passed handily. In urban areas, where gun violence is more 
prevalent, voters rejected the measure by a large margin—30,000 votes in St. Louis and more 
than 100,000 in the county.”); Karen E. Culp, Bill to Carry Concealed Guns Stalls in Senate, 
NEWS-LEADER (Springfield, Mo.), May 15, 2002, at 5 (“In [rural] Greene County in 1999, 
Proposition B received 23,647 yes votes and 20,962 no votes. In St. Louis, the vote was 16,945 
yes and 48,474 no, according to the 1999–2000 Missouri State Manual.”). 
 18. The Missouri General Assembly is structured much like Congress. A House of 
Representatives and a Senate combine to form the General Assembly. In 2003, the Missouri 
Senate was composed of thirty-four members who each represented a district of approximately 
164,000 people. Missouri State Senate, http://www.senate.state.mo.us/04info/facts.htm (last 
visited May 16, 2006). The geographic size of senatorial districts ranged from a “few square 
miles in some urban areas to 16 counties in some rural areas.” Id. The Missouri House of 
Representatives contained 163 members. Missouri House of Representatives, Frequently Asked 
Questions, http://www.house.state.mo.us/default.aspx?info=/info/memfaq.htm (last visited May 
16, 2006). If the governor vetoes a bill, as Governor Holden did to the bill that eventually 
became Concealed-Carry, a two-thirds vote by members of both houses is required to override 
the veto. Missouri State Senate, How a Bill Becomes a Law, http://www.senate.state.mo.us/ 
04info/bill-law.htm (last visited May 16, 2006). In 2003, this meant that at least 132 members 
of the General Assembly voted to override Governor Holden’s veto to pass Concealed-Carry 
into law. 
 19. Lynn M. Ewing III, Concealed Carry: The Law of Unintended Consequences? or 
Right or Wrong, It’s Still Swiss Cheese, 60 J. MO. B. 136, 136 (2004). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/16
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issue permits to any qualified individual.20 The Committee on Crime 
Prevention and Public Safety explicitly cited the interests of 
individuals living in rural areas as a reason for the law’s enactment.21 
This legislative action allows any person holding a concealed-
carry permit issued by Missouri or another state to carry a concealed 
weapon into a polling place, a church, or a school without facing 
criminal prosecution.22 Instead, a permit holder that violates the law 
by bringing a firearm into a restricted location can expect, at worst, a 
fine and the loss of his or her permit, but only after three such 
infractions in one year.23 However, the issuance of a fine or citation 
for a first offense is at the discretion of the peace officer called to the 
 
 20. MO. REV. STAT. § 571.101.1 (2004) (“If the said applicant can show qualification as 
provided by sections 571.101 to 571.121, the county or city sheriff shall issue a certificate of 
qualification for a concealed carry endorsement.”). Commentators have identified four types of 
concealed weapons legislation: “unregulated, permissive/shall issue, discretionary, and 
prohibited.” Lara L. Overton, Permit to Carry Legislation: Has the Time Come for Change in 
Minnesota’s Firearm Legislation and Policy?, 21 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 95, 104 (1999). 
“Unregulated” allows for the possession of a concealed weapon without requiring a permit. Id. 
“Permissive or shall issue” legislation obligates the state to issue a permit to carry a concealed 
weapon, provided that the applicant for the permit meets the state’s statutory requirements of 
competency, usually including a criminal background check, inquiry into mental problems or 
drug use, gun training and other factors. Id. at 105. Whereas permissive legislation requires the 
state to issue a permit after the applicant has satisfied the statutory requirements, discretionary 
legislation allows law enforcement officials or judges the discretion to grant a qualified 
applicant a permit based on his or her ability to prove a “compelling need” for the permit. Id. at 
105–06. Prohibitive legislation allows only police and the military to legally carry concealed 
weapons; no private citizen may carry a concealed weapon in a state with prohibitive 
legislation. Id. at 106. 
 21. COMM. ON CRIME PREVENTION & PUB. SAFETY, supra note 8, at 4 (“People who live 
in rural areas can’t rely upon law enforcement to protect them all the time, because there are too 
few deputies covering a large geographical area. . . . When methamphetamine dealers set up 
labs in the woods nearby, and the closest sheriff’s deputy is a half hour away, a person needs to 
be able to protect himself.”). 
 22. MO. REV. STAT. § 571.107.2 (2004) states: 
Carrying of a concealed firearm in [locations such as churches and polling places] by 
any individual who holds a concealed carry endorsement . . . shall not be a criminal act 
but may subject the person to denial to the premises or removal from the premises. If 
such person refuses to leave the premises and a peace officer is summoned, such 
person may be issued a citation for an amount not to exceed one hundred dollars for 
the first offense . . . . If a third citation for a similar violation is issued within one year 
of the first citation, such person shall be fined an amount not to exceed five hundred 
dollars and shall have his or her concealed carry endorsement revoked and such person 
shall not be eligible for a concealed carry endorsement for a period of three years. 
Id. 
 23. Id. 
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site of the infraction; thus, it is quite possible that the offending 
permit holder will suffer no more than a warning.24 Moreover, if the 
owner or proprietor of the premises asks a permit holder to leave and 
he or she refuses, the permit holder most likely cannot even be 
charged with trespassing.25 
In Brooks v. State, the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the state’s 
concealed-carry law.26 Judge Stephen Limbaugh, Jr., wrote the 
opinion of the court,27 agreeing with other courts that had faced 
similar challenges to concealed-carry laws.28 The court found that 
language of the Missouri Constitution that seems to prohibit the 
carrying of concealed weapons meant only that the constitution alone 
did not create a right to carry concealed weapons.29 However, the 
court concluded that this language did not generally prohibit the 
carrying of concealed weapons.30 Therefore, the court reasoned that 
the legislature was free to permit concealed weapons without 
violating the state constitution.31  
The court also held that the law constituted an “unfunded 
mandate,” prohibited by the Hancock Amendment32 to the Missouri 
Constitution, in four counties for which the anticipated costs of 
carrying out the law were demonstrated; the court thus gave those 
four counties the choice whether to use or not use county funds to 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Ewing, supra note 19, at 140 (concluding that section 571.107.2 “would seem to 
preclude prosecution” of the permit holder for any crime including criminal trespass). 
 26. Brooks v. State, 128 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Mo. 2004). 
 27. Id. at 846. 
 28. See David B. Kopel, The Licensing of Concealed Handguns for Lawful Protection: 
Support from Five State Supreme Courts, 68 ALB. L. REV. 305, 306–09 (2005) (reviewing 
similar reasoning by the New Mexico Supreme Court); Thomas E.J. Hazard, In the Crosshairs: 
Colorado’s New Gun Laws, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2004, at 11 (reviewing a similar challenge to 
concealed-carry law under Colorado’s Constitution).  
 29. Brooks, 128 S.W.3d at 847. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. (“There is no constitutional prohibition against the wearing of concealed weapons; 
there is only a prohibition against invoking the right to keep and bear arms to justify the 
wearing of concealed weapons. Consequently, the General Assembly . . . has the final say in the 
use and regulation of concealed weapons.”). 
 32. Article X, sections 16 and 21, of the Missouri Constitution (provisions of the Hancock 
Amendment) prohibit the state from “requiring any new or expanded activities by counties and 
other political subdivisions without full state financing, or from shifting the tax burden to 
counties and other political subdivisions.” MO. CONST. art. X, §§ 16, 21. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/16
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distribute permits.33 All four counties have recently begun to issue 
permits.34 The court concluded that the “unfunded mandate” issue 
was not ripe as to the Missouri counties for which costs were not 
demonstrated.35 
While the court did not explicitly address the disparate urban and 
rural concerns, the opinion contains some indication that the court 
ignored the urban perspective on the concealed-carry issue in favor of 
the rural perspective. For example, the court acknowledged that the 
defendants were denied their request to change venue from the City 
of St. Louis to rural Cole County, even though this was not an issue 
and the court did not need to address it.36 Mentioning the rejected 
venue change when there was no need to do so may indicate that the 
court was at least aware of the divergent urban and rural opinions on 
gun legislation. In addition, the court dismissed, as a “series of far-
fetched hypotheticals,” plaintiffs’ argument that the law should be 
void for vagueness because it “fails to provide adequate notice of the 
prohibited conduct and set standards for its fair enforcement.”37 One 
of the hypothetical situations involved what the plaintiff called a 
“Hobson’s Choice” for business proprietors confronted with a permit-
holding customer who refused to leave the business premises after 
being asked to do so.38 This hypothetical situation seems more likely 
to occur in urban areas with many businesses than in rural areas that 
can only support a small number of businesses. Yet, the court 
dismissed the likelihood of this situation occurring as “far-fetched.”39 
 
 33. Brooks, 128 S.W.3d at 850. The four counties were Jackson, Cape Girardeau, Greene 
and Camden. Id. Three of the four counties above could be classified as urban. 
 34. Jackson County was the last of the four counties to begin issuing permits after recently 
receiving $48,000 from the county legislature “to cover overtime costs of issuing the permits.” 
Sheriff Will Issue Conceal-Carry Permits, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 21, 2005, at B2. St. 
Louis County began accepting applications for permits on July 13, 2005, and St. Louis City 
followed suit on July 25. Greg Jonsson, County, City Will Issue Concealed-Carry Permits, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 13, 2005, at A1.  
 35. Brooks, 128 S.W.3d at 849–50. 
 36. Id. at 846. The defendants probably realized that a court in a rural county would be 
more likely to favor concealed-carry than a court in an urban county. 
 37. Id. at 851. 
 38. Brief for Respondents/Cross-Appellants at 107–08, Brooks, 128 S.W.3d 844 (No. SC 
85674). 
 39. Brooks, 128 S.W.3d at 851. The fact that this represents a particularly urban argument 
that the Court flatly rejects is further outlined below.  
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Perhaps most strikingly, the court gave no deference to the fact 
that a majority of the population of Missouri, mostly urban voters, 
rejected Proposition B just four years earlier.40 Plaintiff argued that 
“[t]he defeat of Proposition B . . . should preclude subsequent 
legislative action that allows what the Proposition would have 
allowed.”41 The court responded by concluding that “[n]o court, at 
least in this state, has ever so held, and . . . to do so would be to call 
into question the entire concept of representative democracy.”42 The 
court deemed it irrelevant that, on the issue of concealed-carry, 
Missouri’s representative democracy did not represent the will of the 
majority of citizens it was supposed to represent.43 
In 2004, St. Louis County and St. Louis City won challenges to 
concealed-carry as an “unfunded mandate” prohibited by Missouri’s 
Constitution by demonstrating the law’s costs.44 Consequently, St. 
Louis County and St. Louis City sheriffs were not required to 
distribute concealed-carry permits if they chose not to do so.45 
However, recent legislation amended the law so that it is no longer an 
unfunded mandate.46 As a result, St. Louis City and St. Louis County 
have begun to issue permits.47 
II. RURAL AND URBAN ARGUMENTS 
Living in a rural or urban environment shapes the way one thinks 
about, votes on, and judges matters concerning gun legislation. 
However, for too long, legal scholars have focused on the effects of 
gun control legislation, and ignored why people think the way they 
do about gun control.48 The debate has focused on whether the 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Concealed Weapon Update for St. Louis County Residents, http://www.co.st-
louis.mo.us/index.cfm?ViewMe=4817 (last visited May 16, 2006). 
 45. Id. Both St. Louis City and County refused to issue concealed-carry permits, leaving 
the St. Louis area as the last place in Missouri where permits were not distributed. See Jonsson, 
supra note 34, at A1. 
 46. Jonsson, supra note 34, at A1. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Perhaps this is due to the fact that statistical proof of belief is much harder to acquire 
than statistical proof of the results of a given policy. 
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availability of guns will result in less or more crime.49 Much of the 
statistical research supports both sides of the argument.50 As soon as 
one side concludes definitively, based on empirical data, that a 
society that allows open access to firearms has less crime and is safer 
than one that restricts access, the other side takes issue with the 
methodology of the research and definitively concludes that, in fact, 
the opposite is the case.51 The fact that statistical data can be and has 
been manipulated to prove both points so frequently has led some to 
conclude that the statistical correlation between gun laws and gun 
violence is less important than the opinions held by the lawmakers 
and the citizens they represent.52  
While empirical data has remained an important device for 
justifying gun legislation, it appears to have little bearing on how 
people develop beliefs about the legislation.53 According to Kahan 
and Braman, “numerous studies have found that neither actual crime 
rates, perceived crime rates, prior victimization, nor fear of 
victimization strongly correlates with public opinion toward gun 
control.”54 In other words, ideology matters more in determining 
what one thinks about gun control than the statistical link between 
crime and gun availability.55 Further, whether one comes from an 
 
 49. See JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN-
CONTROL LAWS (2d ed. 2000); Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting down the “More 
Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193 (2003); Mark Duggan, More Guns, 
More Crime, 109 J. POL. ECON. 1086 (2001).  
 50. Kahan & Braman, supra note 4, at 1292–93 (“[S]ocial scientists have attacked the gun 
issue with a variety of empirical methods—from multivariate regression models to contingent 
valuation studies to public-health risk-factor analyses.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 51. See id. at 1293 (“Perhaps empirical social science has failed to quiet public 
disagreement over gun control because empirical social scientists have not yet reached their 
own consensus on what the consequences of gun control really are.”). 
 52. Id. at 1317 (concluding that “those involved in the gun control debate aren’t really 
arguing about whose perception of risk is more grounded in empirical reality; they are arguing 
about what it would say about our shared values to credit one or the other side’s fears through 
law”). 
 53. Id. at 1321 (“While predictably failing to change anyone’s mind, empirical analyses 
do reinforce the conviction of those who already accept their conclusions that a rational and just 
assessment of the facts must support their position.”). 
 54. Id. at 1312. 
 55. Kahan and Braman posit the cultural theory of risk as a way of assessing ideology. Id. 
at 1295–99. One’s risk perception is heavily influenced by the norms of one’s society. Id. at 
1295. Further, one’s risk perception creates political ideology. Id. at 1296–97. 
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urban or rural environment is a very important factor contributing to 
one’s ideology.56 One’s surroundings play a large role in the 
messages one receives and, ultimately, the conclusions one draws 
about guns and gun control.57 
While there are exceptions to the generalizations about rural and 
urban populations, the way that both groups are perceived by those 
who represent them may ensure that future gun legislation appeals to 
the interests and opinions of both groups more equally than 
Missouri’s current concealed-carry law. 
A. The Rural Perspective 
This part identifies some characteristics that most rural individuals 
share and describes how these characteristics shape the rural view of 
gun control.58 Once a basis for the rural opinion is established, this 
part explores how the general opinion on gun control was manifest in 
 
Of all the potential hazards that compete for our attention, the ones most likely to 
penetrate our consciousness are the ones that comport with our norm-pervaded moral 
evaluations: it is easy to believe that ignoble activities are also physically dangerous, 
and worthy ones benign. . . .  
[P]ublic disagreements over risks are, in truth, disputes among citizens who subscribe 
to competing norms and to the conflicting cultural visions that those norms construct. 
Id. 
 56. Id. at 1314 (noting that people “naturally look to those whom they trust to tell them 
what to believe about the consequences of gun control laws. The people they trust . . . are the 
ones who share their cultural outlooks, and who, as a result of those outlooks, are more 
disposed to credit one sort of gun control risk than the other”) (footnote omitted). 
 57. The social norms upon which the cultural theory of risk depends are derived from a 
society of like-minded people. While Kahan and Braman focus their attention on the individual, 
describing individuals as hierarchical, individualist, solidaristic or egalitarian, this Note focuses 
more on the larger units these individuals form when they choose to congregate in densely or 
sparsely populated areas. See id. at 1303. 
 58. One important factor, not discussed in this Note, that shapes the way that urban and 
rural people view guns may be the segregation of gun ownership by population density lines. 
Rural individuals, especially men, are much more likely than urbanites to have grown up 
around guns, and subsequently to own them. TOM W. SMITH, 2001 NATIONAL GUN POLICY 
SURVEY OF THE NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER: RESEARCH FINDINGS 12 (2001) 
(showing that rural people tend to oppose gun control) [hereinafter SMITH, 2001]; TOM W. 
SMITH, 1999 NATIONAL GUN POLICY SURVEY OF THE NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER: 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 20 (2000), available at http://www.norc.uchicago.edu/online/gunrpt.pdf; 
JAMES D. WRITE ET AL., UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME, AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 122 
(1983) (“Relative to nonowners, gun owners are disproportionably rural, Southern, male, 
Protestant, affluent, and middle class.”). 
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specific arguments before the Missouri Supreme Court and the 
Missouri General Assembly, and how the court and legislature relied 
on these arguments as a rationale for the concealed-carry law. 
Kahan and Braman describe opponents of gun control as 
hierarchical and individualistic.59 They define a hierarchical person 
as one who “favors deference to traditional forms of social and 
political authority and is protective of the roles and status claims they 
entail.”60 Rural gun advocates are most likely hierarchical.61 They 
hold great deference for a literalist reading of the highest legal 
authority of the United States, the Constitution, or at least of its 
Second Amendment.62 They also gravitate toward religious services 
that offer a sense of order and hierarchy.63 Some gun advocates even 
cite the Bible as a basis for less restrictive gun control laws.64  
Kahan and Braman describe an individualist as one who “prizes 
individual autonomy, celebrates free markets and other 
institutionalized forms of private ordering, and resents collective 
 
 59. Kahan & Braman, supra note 4, at 1307. Kahan and Braman used the 1988–2000 
General Social Survey to construct “scales for measuring respondents’ cultural orientations.” Id. 
at 1302. For more details about their methodology, see id. at 1303–08. 
 60. Id. at 1297. 
 61. The gun symbolizes the same things for rural people that it does for hierarchical 
people: courage, honor, martial prowess and masculinity. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, 
Caught in the Crossfire: A Defense of the Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1395, 1412 (2003) (noting that guns “are part of the symbolic equipment . . . that 
enables men to occupy distinctively male roles (father, hunter, protector) and exhibit 
distinctively male virtues (courage, honor, responsibility, martial prowess). They are the badges 
of institutions (the military, the police) that are themselves hierarchic”) (footnote omitted). 
 62. Simeon Kim, Comment, Utopia or the Wild, Wild, West? The Right to Carry 
Concealed Handguns Law: Senate Bill 1190 and House Bill 2164, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 597, 605 
(1997) (“Right to carry law supporters argue that the Second Amendment guarantees a 
constitutional right to carry concealed weapons.” (citing William Van Alstyne, The Second 
Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236, 1243 (1994))). 
 63. Not surprisingly, conservative Christian churches that preach about the hierarchy of 
heaven topped by an almost vindictive male God find their largest followings in rural areas. See 
DAVID ZEIDAN, THE RESURGENCE OF RELIGION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SELECTED 
THEMES IN CHRISTIAN AND ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST DISCOURSES 25–29 (2003); MEET 
YOUR NEIGHBORS: INTERFAITH FACTS 4 (2003), available at http://fact.hartsem.edu/ 
MeetNgbors1.pdf.  
 64. See Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, “Shall Issue”: The New Wave of 
Concealed Handgun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679, 724–30 (1995) (piecing together a 
Biblical and Judeo-Christian justification for the carrying of weapons); Aaron Wildavsky, 
Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference 
Formation, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 11 (1987) (“Hierarchical cultures favor social 
conservatism, giving government the right to intervene in matters of personal morality.”). 
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interference with the same.”65 It is likely that an individualistic 
person would be attracted to a rural lifestyle.66 Generally, people who 
prefer to depend on themselves for everything from food to shelter 
pursue a rural lifestyle. Rural individualists believe that people 
should be free to acquire and use guns for everything from protection 
to hunting,67 and they resent legislation that limits that freedom. 
The Missouri Supreme Court had to choose between a 
hierarchical, literalist reading of the Missouri Constitution consistent 
with rural ideology, and a more broad, less literalist reading 
consistent with urban ideology.68 In upholding concealed-carry, the 
court adopted the literalist interpretation of the state constitution, 
consistent with rural deference to the document.69 This deference to 
the literal meaning also led the court to conclude that the concealed-
carry statute constituted an “unfunded mandate” in the four counties 
that proved that the future expenses associated with distributing 
concealed-carry permits would not be funded by the state.70  
 
 65. Kahan & Braman, supra note 4, at 1297.  
 66. Kahan, supra note 5, at 453 (noting that for gun control opponents, the gun 
symbolizes the “independent frontiersman who takes care of himself and his family with no 
interference from the state”) (citations omitted). This independent frontiersman image almost 
certainly resonates with rural individuals who, in many respects, live like the frontiersmen they 
idealize. 
 67. Rural residents are statistically more likely to carry guns for protection, hunting and 
target practice than their urban counterparts. SMITH, 2001, supra note 58, at 30. They are also 
statistically more likely to oppose gun control laws than their urban counterparts. Id. at 35. 
 68. Brooks v. State, 128 S.W.3d 844, 846–47 (Mo. 2004). 
 69. The Missouri Constitution states: “That the right of every citizen to keep and bear 
arms . . . shall not be questioned; but this shall not justify the wearing of concealed weapons.” 
MO. CONST. art. I, § 23. Applying common usage aided primarily by dictionary definitions, the 
Brooks court concluded that the Missouri Constitution must be read this way: “but this [the 
right of every citizen to keep and bear arms . . .] shall not justify [shall not warrant, shall not 
furnish grounds or evidence for, shall not support, or shall not provide sufficient legal reasons 
for] the wearing of concealed weapons.” 128 S.W.3d at 847 (bracket references in original). 
Applying its literal reading of the Constitution, the court held that “[t]here is no constitutional 
prohibition against the wearing of concealed weapons; there is only a prohibition against 
invoking the right to keep and bear arms to justify the wearing of concealed weapons.” Id. 
 70. Brooks, 128 S.W.3d at 850. The Hancock Amendment prohibits the state from 
“requiring any new or expanded activities by counties and other political subdivisions without 
full state financing, or from shifting the tax burdens to counties and other political 
subdivisions.” Id. at 848 (quoting MO. CONST. art. X, § 16). Section 571.094.10 provides for a 
sheriff’s fee of up to $100 for the issuance of a concealed-carry permit. Id. However, because 
this fee must be deposited into the sheriff’s revolving fund, and thus is not used directly to fund 
the provisions of concealed-carry, the court concluded that the statute constituted an “unfunded 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/16
p407 Pierce book pages.doc  11/1/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006]  Concealed-Carry in Missouri 419 
 
 
One rural argument against gun control that influenced the 
Missouri General Assembly was that concealed-carry laws are 
necessary to allow rural individuals to protect themselves from 
methamphetamine labs.71 The Committee on Crime Prevention and 
Public Safety asserted that “[w]hen methamphetamine dealers set up 
labs in the woods nearby, and the closest sheriff’s deputy is a half 
hour away, a person needs to be able to protect himself.”72 
Methamphetamine labs are undeniably a significant problem in rural 
Missouri.73 However, the ability of citizens to carry concealed 
weapons has little to do with their safety from methamphetamine 
producers.74 If anything, a law permitting concealed weapons 
inadvertently gives the prosecution one less potential charge against a 
methamphetamine producer who has a concealed-carry permit.75 
While the concealed-carry law was meant to protect innocent rural 
citizens who happen to stumble across a methamphetamine lab by 
decriminalizing the carrying of a concealed weapon by permit 
 
mandate” in those counties that prove ripeness by showing evidence of increased costs. Id. at 
850. 
 71. COMM. ON CRIME PREVENTION & PUB. SAFETY, supra note 8, at 4. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Missouri led the nation in the number of methamphetamine lab seizures from 2001 
through 2003. Matthew Hathaway, State Sees No Relief in Meth Fight, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Feb. 27, 2004, at B1. Approximately 2850 methamphetamine lab discoveries were 
reported in Missouri in 2003. Id. Jefferson County, a predominantly rural county that borders 
St. Louis County, led the State in 2003 with 161 raids. Id. 
 74. As Cramer and Kopel point out, “[t]he only circumstances under which a concealed 
handgun is likely to come to the attention of the police are that either the weapon was drawn, or 
that the person carrying it was searched by the police for some other, presumably criminal 
reason.” Cramer & Kopel, supra note 64, at 687–88. Consequently, in the middle of the woods 
with the nearest deputy over an hour away, if one comes across a methamphetamine lab, there 
would be no police officers to arrest the person for carrying a concealed weapon, just as there 
would be no officer to arrest the dangerous meth producer. Alternatively, if there were police 
officers around to arrest the innocent wayward wanderer for carrying a concealed weapon, 
presumably those officers would be more interested in capturing the inhabitants of the 
methamphetamine lab. Either way, the concealed weapon carrier escapes police questioning and 
subsequent criminal prosecution without the protection of a concealed-carry permit. 
 75. It is not a crime for a concealed-carry permit holder to carry a concealed weapon in 
the state of Missouri. MO. REV. STAT. § 571.030.4 (2000). Therefore, the prosecution may not 
charge a permit holder accused of methamphetamine related crimes with the additional crime of 
carrying a concealed weapon. As a consequence, the concealed-carry law may deny the 
prosecutor an opportunity to charge the accused with a Class D felony for unlawful use of a 
weapon, as described in section 571.030.7, if there is insufficient evidence to support a charge 
related to the methamphetamine production.  
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holders and by giving citizens the right to brandish weapons for 
protection, the law may, in fact, protect the methamphetamine 
producer more than it will protect the innocent rural traveler.76 
The rural gun advocate’s argument is that public safety depends 
on the ability to carry concealed weapons.77 One compelling story 
familiar to the Missouri General Assembly is that of Dr. Suzanna 
Gratia.78 Dr. Gratia was a Luby’s cafeteria patron in the rural town of 
Killeen, Texas, who claims that she could have shot and killed a 
fellow patron who killed twenty-three people in ten minutes if Texas 
had been a concealed-carry state.79 Unfortunately for the other 
patrons, Dr. Gratia obeyed the law at the time and kept her gun in her 
car.80 This story and others like it helped convince the Missouri 
legislature that, in the interest of public safety, citizens should be 
allowed to carry concealed weapons.81 
B. The Urban Perspective 
This part identifies the characteristics that many urban individuals 
share and describes how these characteristics shape a very different 
opinion of gun control than that held by their rural neighbors.82 This 
part then discusses the specific urban arguments against concealed-
carry that the Missouri Supreme Court and General Assembly 
ignored. 
 
 76. It may no longer be a crime in Missouri for permit holders to carry a concealed 
firearm, but it is still a crime to discharge a firearm at any person or any building or habitable 
structure unless the person acted lawfully in self-defense, whether or not one owns a concealed-
carry permit. Id. § 571.030.1(9). The firearm arguably serves little protective purpose to the 
person who stumbles upon a methamphetamine lab until the weapon is discharged at the 
producer of the methamphetamine or at the lab itself. However, discharging the weapon may 
open the innocent rural traveler to criminal prosecution unless self-defense is established, 
regardless of the person’s status as a permit holder. 
 77. See generally LOTT, supra note 49; Cramer & Kopel, supra note 64. 
 78. See Cramer & Kopel, supra note 64, at 718–19. 
 79. Id. at 719. 
 80. Id. 
 81. A few months after the incident, Dr. Gratia testified before the Missouri Legislature in 
favor of concealed-carry. Id. 
 82. While gun advocates see the gun as a symbol of rugged individualism and protection, 
gun control proponents take an opposite view. Kahan, supra note 5, at 455–57. They deride the 
rural symbol as “uncivilized” and “atavistic.” Id. at 456. 
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While rural gun advocates tend to be individualistic and 
hierarchical, urban gun control advocates tend to be egalitarian and 
solidaristic.83 The egalitarian person “abhors social stratification, 
distrusts the social and political authority structures that rest on such 
differentiation, and favors collective action to equalize wealth, status, 
and power.”84 Contrary to their hierarchical counterparts, egalitarians 
favor a less literalist interpretation of the documents that are the 
pinnacles of American law.85 Gun control proponents prefer to 
abandon the rigid, literalist reading of the Second Amendment’s right 
to bear arms in favor of a policy banning the private ownership of all 
guns, similar to policies adopted by several European countries.86  
Urban individuals tend not only to be egalitarian, but also 
solidaristic, defined as “logically opposed to individualism.”87 Urban 
individuals generally have an easier time than their rural counterparts 
in relying on other people for support.88 Perhaps this is because urban 
populations are used to receiving aid from and giving aid to others.89 
Whether it is with a free meal from Meals on Wheels or a free house 
from Habitat for Humanity, large urban populations benefit more 
from social welfare organizations than smaller rural populations.90 
 
 83. Kahan & Braman, supra note 4, at 1303 (positing that the urban rejection of 
traditional honor norms is tied to an egalitarian “opposition to social differentiation” and 
“tolerance of deviance”). Meanwhile, the perception that gun ownership is “uncivilized” 
represents a threat to a solidaristic individual primarily concerned with the establishment and 
maintenance of civilization. See supra note 82. 
 84. Kahan & Braman, supra note 4, at 1297. 
 85. See Richard Hofstadter, America as a Gun Culture, 21 AM. HERITAGE, Oct. 1970, at 
4. 
 86. Id. (asserting that America is the “only nation so attached to the supposed ‘right’ to 
bear arms that its laws abet assassins, professional criminals, berserk murderers, and political 
terrorists at the expense of the orderly population,” and that “[in other countries in which] rights 
are rather better protected than in ours . . . our arms control policies would be considered 
laughable”). 
 87. Kahan & Braman, supra note 4, at 1303. 
 88. See Howard V. Brabson & David P. Himle, The Unemployed and the Poor: Differing 
Perceptions of Their Needs in a Community, 13 SOC. THOUGHT 24 (1987); Rebecca Joyce 
Kissane, What’s Need Got to Do with It? Barriers to Use of Nonprofit Social Services, J. SOC. 
& SOC. SERVICES, June 2003, at 2, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/ 
mi_m0CYZ/is_2_30/ai_101762546/print (pointing to inconvenient agency location, inadequate 
hours of service, insufficient information about the agency, and fear of stigmatization as causes 
for the relative infrequency with which rural populations utilize social services). 
 89. See Kissane, supra note 88. 
 90. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p407 Pierce book pages.doc  11/1/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
422 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 21:407 
 
 
Some people who choose to live in urban areas wish not only to 
benefit from the close proximity of others, but also to provide 
benefits to others who live close to them.91 
Urban individuals see gun possession as a threat to their sense of 
community. Most urbanites do not shoot the deer or rabbit that 
stumbles onto their property, own concealable guns, or shoot targets 
or humans.92 Nothing is more destructive to a sense of community 
than murder. Consequently, many urban dwellers frown on the 
possession of weapons as an all-too-easy way to end a community.93 
However, the Missouri General Assembly and the Missouri Supreme 
Court abandoned the urban dweller’s desire for a community in 
which it is more difficult to end another person’s life than merely 
pointing a gun and pulling the trigger.94 
While the Brooks majority’s holding favored the rural hierarchal 
perspective, Chief Justice White adopted an urban egalitarian reading 
of the state constitution in his dissent.95 Reading the Hancock 
Amendment literally, the majority held that only the four counties 
that demonstrated evidence of additional costs had standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of concealed-carry as an “unfunded 
mandate.”96 Alternatively, Chief Justice White advocated an 
expansive reading of the Hancock Amendment, which required the 
repeal of concealed-carry as an “unfunded mandate” in every 
Missouri county, regardless of a showing of incurred costs.97 
Another particularly urban concern that Missouri overlooked 
when passing the concealed-carry law is the high cost that the law 
poses to urban businesses.98 Because more businesses operate in large 
 
 91. More social service organizations are available and located in urban areas than in rural 
areas. NANCY M. PINDUS, IMPLEMENTING WELFARE REFORM IN RURAL COMMUNITIES 1–2 
(2001), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/rural-welfarereform.pdf. 
 92. The most common reason that people living in large cities carry guns is for target 
shooting (11.8%), followed by self-protection (7.9%), hunting (5.8%), other (3.5%) and work 
(1.7%). See SMITH, 2001, supra note 58, at 30. 
 93. Residents of urban areas are most supportive of measures to regulate guns. See id. at 
12. 
 94. See COMM. ON CRIME PREVENTION & PUB. SAFETY, supra note 8, at 4 (relying on the 
need for self-defense as a justification for the legislation). 
 95. Brooks v. State, 128 S.W.3d 844, 851–55 (Mo. 2004) (White, C.J., dissenting). 
 96. Id. at 850. 
 97. Id. at 852. 
 98. Donnie E. Martin, “Concealed Carry” Legislation and Workplace Violence: A 
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population centers, office building violence is a serious and 
especially urban concern.99 Workplace violence has been “the 
paramount security concern for corporations across America.”100 The 
costs incurred because of office violence go beyond damage to 
property and harm to employees that are the immediate results of the 
violence.101 Businesses also lose future employees and clients if they 
acquire a reputation as an unsafe place.102 They may suffer large 
litigation costs to compensate employees who allege wrongful hiring 
practices or inadequate safety procedures.103 In addition to negligent 
hiring and negligent retention claims in state courts, employers could 
also face federal liability.104 Finally, they may incur costs associated 
with establishing “no gun” policies.105 These costs will be amplified 
in Missouri by concealed-carry laws.106 
 
Nightmare in Employers’ Liability?, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 100, 103 (1998) (noting many of the 
jobs that the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) has identified as 
having the highest rates of occupational homicide as “taxicab drivers, law enforcement officers, 
hotel clerks, gas station workers, security guards, stack handlers, store owners/managers, and 
bartenders,” jobs which are most prevalent in cities). 
 99. See id. Because most employees require free access to the workplace and to one 
another to do their jobs, co-worker violence is already difficult to stop. Id. Allowing employees 
the option of carrying concealed weapons into the workplace makes it considerably more 
difficult to deter co-worker violence. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id. at 103–05 (discussing theories of employer liability); see also Hazard, supra 
note 28, at 16–17 (discussing the implications of banning weapons in businesses). 
 102. See Martin, supra note 98, at 105 (advising employers to implement procedures to 
guarantee “quality pre-hiring background checks and adequate supervision of employees” to 
avoid liability). 
 103. Id. at 104. The article describes the prima facie requirements for a claim of either 
negligent hiring or negligent retention in state courts as: 
(1) the employee was unfit for hiring or retention; (2) the employer knew or should 
have known that the employee was unfit; (3) the employer could foresee that the 
employee, through his employment, would come into contact with the plaintiff under 
circumstances creating a risk of danger to the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff was injured; 
and (5) the employer’s negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. 
Id. 
 104. Hazard, supra note 28, at 17 (suggesting that allowing guns in the workplace may 
violate the general duty clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, which imposes upon 
employers an obligation to provide a safe work environment “free from recognized hazards that 
are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm” (quoting 29 U.S.C. 
§ 654(a)(1) (2000))). 
 105. For the proposition that adopting a “no weapons” policy may help prove that the 
employer could foresee potential injury through gun violence, see id. at 16 (referencing Massie 
v. Godfather’s Pizza, Inc., 844 F.2d 1414 (10th Cir. 1988), in which the court held that the 
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Moreover, the institution and enforcement of “no gun” policies by 
businesses will consume precious resources.107 Large corporations 
may need to develop a committee on guns to research and implement 
a comprehensive “no gun” policy. In smaller businesses, already 
overworked employees will have to divert their attention from daily 
management tasks to the implementation of a gun policy that will 
protect against liability. Ironically, “no gun” policies designed to 
protect against liability may increase a corporation’s loss when 
workplace violence occurs.108 The existence of a “no gun” policy 
may serve as proof of the employer’s duty to its employees to hire 
employees who will comply with the policy and enforce it when 
another employee violates it.109 Once this duty is established, a claim 
of negligent hiring is much easier to establish.110 
Even if the “no gun” policy is perfectly devised, its enforcement 
could be extremely costly.111 Businesses will not only have to post no 
 
adoption of a “robbery” policy established that the criminal conduct at issue in the case was 
foreseeable). 
 106. See generally Ewing, supra note 19, at 139–40. 
 107. Martin, supra note 98, at 106. Any no-weapons policy must be carefully drafted 
because an “ambiguous prohibition policy may lead to additional liability exposure for the 
employer.” Id. The employer “may subject itself to negligence liability if the employee cannot 
defend against ‘violent’ third parties because the employer has taken away the legal right to 
self-protection.” Id. at 106–07. Simply researching and drafting the policy correctly could prove 
a costly process involving many attorneys. 
 108. See Hazard, supra note 28, at 16. 
 109. Id. at 16–17. 
 110. Id. Also, in states such as Colorado that make it illegal for an employer to terminate an 
employee for lawful off-work activities, the employer’s suspicion or even knowledge that the 
permit holder legally carried a concealed weapon away from work should not be used as a 
justification for the employee’s termination. Id. at 17. Relying on the use of guns outside of 
work as a justification for terminating a permit holder may make the employer liable for 
wrongful termination. Id. 
 111. Martin, supra note 98, at 107. Martin states that well devised “no gun” policies should 
contain the following elements: 
[1] The policy should be predicated on an employer’s legal duty to provide a safe 
workplace to its employees and to exercise reasonable care in the control and 
supervision of its employees . . . [2] The policy should be broad enough to cover 
concealed and other weapons carried on an employee’s or invitee’s person, in the 
parking lot, or in a vehicle brought on the employer’s premises. The policy should 
expressly state that despite a jurisdiction’s right to carry law, the employer is allowed 
to prohibit concealed weapons in the workplace . . . [3] The policy should [define 
terms] such as “employees,” “weapons” and “possessing” . . . [4] [The policy should 
comply with the notice requirements of the jurisdiction through the use of signs or 
other forms of notice] . . . [5] Employers may want to include a provision authorizing 
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gun signs, but, in some situations, will have to hire security personnel 
and install screening technology at the entrances of the building to 
more fully protect themselves from liability.112 In Missouri, where 
the most a building proprietor can do to a concealed-carry permit 
holder who is violating the “no gun” policy is ask them to leave, 
enforcement of a “no gun” policy will be nearly impossible.113 
Calling the police on a permit holder who is brandishing a concealed 
weapon is pointless because the permit holder cannot even be 
prosecuted for trespassing if he or she refuses to leave.114 The small 
fine that potentially awaits the unruly permit holder is little 
deterrence.115 This was the “Hobson’s Choice” dilemma described by 
the Brooks plaintiffs and rejected by the Missouri Supreme Court as a 
“far-fetched” hypothetical that should be dealt with after it arose.116 
III. WHY ABANDON URBAN VOTERS? 
There may be no dispositive reason why both the Missouri 
General Assembly and the Missouri Supreme Court disregarded the 
interests of Missouri’s urban constituency in favor of those of the 
rural population, but the General Assembly’s decision could certainly 
have been influenced by money, by the structure of the legislature, or 
 
them to conduct searches at work [provided these searches do not intrude upon areas 
within the employees’ exclusive control where employees have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy] . . . [6] [If employers include search provisions,] [e]mployers 
should require their employees to sign consent forms . . . [and the employer] should 
state plainly that desks, storage areas and lockers are considered employer property . . . 
[7] [Each employee should be required to sign a written acknowledgment showing that 
the employee has reviewed the policy] . . . [8] The policy should state that any 
employee or applicant who violates the policy is subject to disciplinary action, up to 
and including termination of employment without warning. 
Id. 
 112. While screening is fairly innocuous when conducted on employees who consent to 
such screening, it becomes a potential for liability when conducted on customers. Hazard, supra 
note 28, at 18. Business owners face a risk of invasion of privacy and assault claims if they try 
to enforce their “no gun” policies by patting down their patrons to determine whether the 
customer is carrying a concealed gun. Id. Even if the fear of liability would not sufficiently 
deter certain screening conduct by business owners, the potential loss of customers unwilling to 
submit to pat downs probably would. Id. 
 113. See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. 
 114. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 115. Ewing, supra note 19, at 139. 
 116. Brooks v. State, 128 S.W.3d 844, 851 (Mo. 2004). 
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by the legislators’ personal beliefs that mirror those of the rural 
population. For example, interest groups such as the National Rifle 
Association (NRA) may have had a special influence on some of the 
Missouri legislators.117 If the NRA was willing to spend $3.8 million 
in 1999 to advertise for the adoption of Proposition B,118 it may have 
also been willing to spend money to convince legislators in 2003 that 
a substantially similar bill was necessary. While it may seem cynical 
to suggest that Missouri’s concealed-carry legislation was influenced 
by the NRA, other commentators hold similar views.119 
Secondly, the way that Missouri’s political districts are currently 
drawn may make politicians who vote in favor of gun availability 
more likely to be re-elected.120 This theory is incorrect, however, if 
the rural population is really where gun supporters lie, because 
Missouri’s General Assembly is broken into districts based on 
population. Consequently, to constitute a supermajority such as the 
one needed to override the gubernatorial veto on concealed-carry, 
some urban representatives and senators must have voted for the 
law.121 Perhaps the real reason that the General Assembly rejected the 
urban in favor of the rural argument is that Missouri’s General 
Assembly is composed of people who share the same beliefs 
concerning gun control as the rural populations. 
Whereas the Missouri General Assembly directly confronted the 
divide between urban and rural opinions on concealed-carry when it 
considered the law, the Missouri Supreme Court did not explicitly 
 
 117. Despite its denial that it contributed to concealed-carry legislation in Missouri, the 
NRA supported the campaigns of a number of Missouri legislators. Missouri Backers of 
Concealed Weapons Ignore the Public, supra note 7, at B6. It seems reasonable that the NRA 
expected support of concealed-carry in return. Id. 
 118. Dionne, supra note 7, at D17. 
 119. See William Greider, A Pistol-Whipped Nation, in CONTROVERSIES IN AMERICAN 
PUBLIC POLICY 436 (John A. Hird ed., 1995) (suggesting that the single biggest obstacle to gun 
control legislation is the NRA and its powerful lobbying efforts). Greider goes on to suggest 
that the NRA actually benefits from gun violence. Id. at 437. The NRA uses every act of gun 
violence on an unarmed victim to prove its point that the only way to stop gun violence is to 
arm everyone. Id.  
 120. See infra note 121. 
 121. For more information on the structure of the Missouri General Assembly, see supra 
note 18. It is important to reiterate that in 2003, 132 of the 196 members of the Missouri 
General Assembly voted to override Governor Holden’s veto of the bill. This means that a 
number of urban politicians voted in the supermajority for concealed-carry. 
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deal with this issue. The court relied heavily on an amicus brief by 
the NRA to guide its reading of the Missouri Constitution.122 The 
court then chose to heed defendant Bull’s Eye’s advice to disregard 
plaintiff’s arguments as “policy.”123 Therefore, the court may not 
have considered how its decision would further divide the two 
populations. However, the court likely would have done nothing 
differently had the policy issues discussed in this Note been brought 
forward.124 It was aware that a majority of the Missouri population 
voted against virtually the same law just four years before it rendered 
its decision.125 The court’s response was that a legislature ignoring 
majority views was a problem for the legislature and the democratic 
process.126 
IV. SOLUTIONS FOR URBANITES 
Missouri’s urban population has several options to make its voice 
heard on the issue of concealed-carry now that the law is in place. 
The first option is to elect new, more representative legislators who 
will repeal the current concealed-carry law or amend it to better 
reflect the divergent views on gun legislation. Senator Doyle 
Childers, a Republican from Reeds Spring, proposed one such 
amendment during the drafting of the bill that eventually became the 
 
 122. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Rifle Ass’n of America, Inc., at 7–16, Brooks v. 
State, 128 S.W.3d 844 (Mo. 2004) (No. SC 85674) (laying out the interpretation of the disputed 
Constitutional phrase eventually adopted by the Court). 
 123. Appellants Bull’s Eye, LLC’s Reply Brief to Respondent’s Brief at 15, 18, Brooks, 
128 S.W.3d 844 (No. SC 85674). 
 124. Courts generally defer to the legislature on matters of public policy. This may stem 
from a prevalent view of the judiciary branch of government as the interpreters of the law, not 
the makers of the law. Courts intervene for public policy reasons only when the public policy is 
particularly compelling. While the interest of a large segment of the population seems 
compelling, gun control is such a divisive issue that it is better left to the political process in a 
democracy, despite the system’s inherent flaws. For interesting discussions of the court’s place 
in a democracy, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2001); Allan Ides, The 
American Democracy and Judicial Review, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1991); Burt Neuborne, Making 
the Law Safe for Democracy: A Review of “The Law of Democracy Etc.,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 
1578 (1999) (reviewing SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (1998)). 
 125. Brooks, 128 S.W.3d at 851. 
 126. Id. 
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concealed-carry law.127 The proposed amendment “would [have] 
exempt[ed] counties with populations of 200,000 or more from the 
concealed weapons laws.”128 As a reason for this amendment, 
Senator Childers cited the fact that the main opponents of Proposition 
B were located in urban areas.129 The amendment was eventually 
dropped to avoid potential legal challenges, but Senator Childers may 
have had the right idea from an urban point of view. 
Missourians may also lobby their current elected officials to adopt 
policies that are more in line with citizen opinions on concealed-carry 
legislation. A representative democracy works best when the 
representatives know how their constituents feel about certain issues. 
Pro-gun activists lobby successfully through grassroots letter writing 
campaigns and larger scale advertising efforts. Perhaps anti-gun 
activists can adopt similar tactics to inform their representatives 
about the concerns of urban populations.130 
The final, and perhaps most realistic, option for urban populations 
concerned with concealed-carry is to do nothing. The law has 
apparently not been as popular as expected. Far fewer people are 
applying for permits than anticipated when the legislation was 
passed.131 One reason for this is that many concealed-carry 
proponents primarily wanted the right to carry guns in their cars’ 
 
 127. Culp, supra note 17. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. One suggestion for anti-gun advertising campaigns would be to target the fears of 
their rural counterparts discussed throughout this Note. Rural gun advocates who primarily 
value independence and hierarchy would respond most favorably to a campaign that frames gun 
control in hierarchical and independent terms. This is a difficult proposition, but a campaign 
that insinuates that large corporations attempt to control the actions of individuals through the 
purchase of weapons may be an option. 
 Similarly, gun advocates who wish to convert their urban counterparts would be wise to 
frame the issue in egalitarian and solidaristic terms. Again, this is a difficult proposition. 
Perhaps carrying concealed weapons could be presented as a way of promoting the common 
good of individual liberty. 
 131. Linda Redeffer, Interest in Conceal Permits Below Expectations, 
SEMISSOURIAN.COM, Dec. 7, 2004, http://semissourian.com/story.html$rec=151804 (noting 
that while the Missouri State Highway Patrol estimated that 60,000 applications for permits 
would be made in the first year based on the response in Texas and Oklahoma when those two 
states adopted similar legislation, the total number of background checks the patrol made on 
individuals seeking permits was only 13,748 between March and November). 
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glove compartments, something they can now do without a permit.132 
Carrying a concealed weapon is still a crime in Missouri if the carrier 
does not have a permit.133 If the number of permit applications is low 
and confined to rural areas, the urban population is unlikely to be 
substantially affected in a negative way. 
CONCLUSION 
Gun control is a very divisive issue, not because people can 
logically deduce the quantifiable results of open access to weapons as 
economists would have us believe, but rather because guns symbolize 
very different things to different people. The effect of wider gun 
availability on crime rates only seems to matter to people who study 
that effect. What really matters are the messages people receive from 
those around them concerning weapons and the use of weapons. 
Guns represent powerful symbols of the things rural people believe 
in, such as respect for hierarchical structures and independence. 
Meanwhile, guns represent equally powerful symbols of the things 
urban people fear most, such as the destruction of community and 
oppression of the many by the few.  
There may be no way to change peoples’ opinions about guns, but 
the lawmakers of a democratic society should seek to identify these 
views and account for them when drafting laws. Missouri’s 
concealed-carry law completely disregards the opinions of almost 
half of its population. While that half of the population whose 
interests and opinions were ignored will likely experience little or no 
direct effects from this particular law, Missouri’s legislative and 
judicial branches have sent its urban populations a clear and 
disturbing message: we do not care what you think and we do not 
have to. Other state governments may feel free to follow suit. 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. MO. REV. STAT. § 571.030.1 (2000). The statute states “[a] person commits the crime 
of unlawful use of weapons if he or she knowingly: (1) Carries concealed upon or about his or 
her person a knife, a firearm, a blackjack or any other weapon readily capable of lethal use.” Id. 
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